

# XOR Count


## November 21st, 2017

FluxFingers

Workgroup Symmetric Cryptography

Ruhr University Bochum

Friedrich Wiemer



# Overview

Joint Work – Its not me alone [Kra+17]<sup>1</sup>

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## Outline

- 1 Motivation
- 2 Preliminaries
- 3 State of the Art and Related Work
- 4 Future Work

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<sup>1</sup>available on eprint: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1151>

# What is the XOR count, and why is it important?

## Some facts

- Lightweight Block Ciphers
- Efficient Linear Layers
- MDS matrices are “optimal” (regarding security)<sup>2</sup>

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- What is the lightest implementable MDS matrix?
- What about additional features (Involutory)?

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## Some facts

- Lightweight Block Ciphers
- Efficient Linear Layers
- MDS matrices are “optimal” (regarding security)<sup>2</sup>
- What is the lightest implementable MDS matrix?
- What about additional features (Involutory)?

## The XOR count

- Metric for needed hardware resources
- Smaller is better

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<sup>2</sup>Are they?

# What is an MDS matrix?

## Definition: MDS

A matrix  $M$  of dimension  $k$  over the field  $\mathbb{F}$  is *maximum distance separable* (MDS), iff all possible submatrices of  $M$  are invertible (or nonsingular).

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## Example


The AES MixCOLUMN matrix is defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^8} \cong \mathbb{F}[x]/0x11b$ :

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0x02 & 0x03 & 0x01 & 0x01 \\ 0x01 & 0x02 & 0x03 & 0x01 \\ 0x01 & 0x01 & 0x02 & 0x03 \\ 0x03 & 0x01 & 0x01 & 0x02 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} x & x+1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & x & x+1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & x & x+1 \\ x+1 & 1 & 1 & x \end{pmatrix}$$

This is a (right) *circulant* matrix:  $\text{circ}(x, x+1, 1, 1)$ .


# What is an MDS matrix?

Constructions




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# What is an MDS matrix?

## Representations

### How to implement this in hardware?

- This is about hardware implementations
- How do we implement a field multiplication in hardware?
- How do we implement a matrix multiplication in hardware?

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- How do we implement a matrix multiplication in hardware?

### Example

$$\alpha \rightarrow \boxed{\cdot 1} \rightarrow \beta$$

$$\alpha \rightarrow \boxed{\cdot x} \rightarrow \beta$$

$$\alpha \rightarrow \boxed{\cdot(x + 1)} \rightarrow \beta$$

# What is an MDS matrix?

## Representations


### How to implement this in hardware?

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- How do we implement a *field multiplication* in hardware?
- How do we implement a matrix multiplication in hardware?

### Example

$$\alpha \rightarrow \boxed{\cdot 1} \rightarrow \beta$$

$$\alpha \rightarrow \boxed{\cdot x} \rightarrow \beta$$



# Field Multiplication in Hardware

From  $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/p(x)$  to  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$

Implement  $\alpha \rightarrow [\cdot 1] \rightarrow \beta$

OK, this one is easy 😊

Example in  $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/0x13$ :

# Field Multiplication in Hardware

From  $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/p(x)$  to  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$

Implement  $\alpha \rightarrow [\cdot 1] \rightarrow \beta$

OK, this one is easy 😊

Example in  $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/0x13$ :

$$\alpha = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 x + \alpha_2 x^2 + \alpha_3 x^3$$

$$\beta = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x + \beta_2 x^2 + \beta_3 x^3$$

$$= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 x + \alpha_2 x^2 + \alpha_3 x^3$$

# Field Multiplication in Hardware

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# Field Multiplication in Hardware

From  $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/p(x)$  to  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ Implement  $\alpha \rightarrow \boxed{\cdot x} \rightarrow \beta$ Example in  $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/0x13$ :

$$\alpha = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1x + \alpha_2x^2 + \alpha_3x^3$$

$$x^4 \equiv x + 1 \pmod{0x13}$$

$$\beta = \beta_0 + \beta_1x + \beta_2x^2 + \beta_3x^3$$

$$= x \cdot (\alpha_0 + \alpha_1x + \alpha_2x^2 + \alpha_3x^3)$$

$$\equiv \alpha_3 + (\alpha_0 + \alpha_3)x + \alpha_1x^2 + \alpha_2x^3$$

# Field Multiplication in Hardware

From  $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/p(x)$  to  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ In matrix notation for  $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/0x13$ :

$$\beta = 1 \cdot \alpha \Leftrightarrow \begin{pmatrix} \beta_0 \\ \beta_1 \\ \beta_2 \\ \beta_3 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \alpha_0 \\ \alpha_1 \\ \alpha_2 \\ \alpha_3 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\beta = x \cdot \alpha \Leftrightarrow \begin{pmatrix} \beta_0 \\ \beta_1 \\ \beta_2 \\ \beta_3 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \alpha_0 \\ \alpha_1 \\ \alpha_2 \\ \alpha_3 \end{pmatrix}$$

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## Companion Matrix

We call  $M_{p(x)} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$  the *companion matrix* of the polynomial  $p(x) = 0x13$ . For any element  $\gamma \in \mathbb{F}_2[x]/p(x)$ , we denote by  $M_\gamma$  the matrix that implements the multiplication by this element in  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ .

# Counting XOR's

## Example

We can rewrite the AES MixColumn matrix as:

$$\mathcal{M}_{\text{AES}} = \text{circ}(x, x + 1, 1, 1) \cong \text{circ}(M_x, M_{x+1}, M_1, M_1).$$

Starting in  $(\mathbb{F}_2[x]/0x11b)^{4 \times 4}$ , we end up in  $(\mathbb{F}_2^{8 \times 8})^{4 \times 4} \cong \mathbb{F}_2^{32 \times 32}$ .

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Starting in  $(\mathbb{F}_2[x]/0x11b)^{4 \times 4}$ , we end up in  $(\mathbb{F}_2^{8 \times 8})^{4 \times 4} \cong \mathbb{F}_2^{32 \times 32}$ .

## A first XOR-count

To implement multiplication by  $\gamma$ , we need  $\text{hw}(\mathbf{M}_\gamma) - \dim(\mathbf{M}_\gamma)$  many XOR's. Thus

$$\begin{aligned}\text{XOR-count}(\mathcal{M}_{\text{AES}}) &= 4 \cdot (\text{hw}(\mathbf{M}_x) + \text{hw}(\mathbf{M}_{x+1}) + 2 \cdot \text{hw}(\mathbf{M}_1)) - 32 \\ &= 4 \cdot (11 + 19 + 2 \cdot 8) - 32 = 152.\end{aligned}$$

# The General Linear Group

Generalise a bit

Instead of choosing elements from  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n} \cong \mathbb{F}_2[x]/p(x)$  we can extend our possible choices for “multiplication matrices” by exploiting the following.

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Todo

Maybe remove this?

# The Stupidity of recent XOR Count Papers


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# State of the Art

Before our Paper

- You saw how to count XORS
- This count is split in the “overhead” and the XORS needed for the field multiplication
- Thus for AES we get  $56 + 8 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 = 56 + 96 = 152$
- Finding a good matrix reduces now to find the cheapest elements for field multiplication
- There is a lot of work following this line [BKL16; JPS17; LS16; LW16; LW17; Sim+15; SS16a; SS16b; SS17; ZWS17]

# State of the Art

Best known Results

$4 \times 4$  matrices over  $\text{GL}(8, \mathbb{F}_2)$

Matrix	Naive	Literature
AES (Circulant)	152	<b>7+96</b>
[Sim+15] (Subfield)	136	40+96
[LS16] (Circulant)	128	32+96
[LW16]	106	10+96
[BKL16] (Circulant)	136	24+96
[SS16b] (Toeplitz)	123	27+96
[JPS17] (Subfield)	122	20+96

## Optimized Arithmetic for Reed-Solomon Encoders

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Worcester Polytechnic Institute  
Worcester, MA 01609  
email: christof@ece.wpi.edu

1997 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, June 29 -- July 4, 1997,  
Ulm, Germany (extended version)

### Abstract

Multiplication with constant elements from Galois fields of characteristic two is the major arithmetic operation in Reed-Solomon encoders. This contribution describes two optimization algorithms which yield low complexity constant multipliers for Ga-

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J. Cryptol. (2013) 26: 280–312  
DOI: 10.1007/s00145-012-9124-7

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Journal of  
**CRYPTOLOGY**

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## Logic Minimization Techniques with Applications to Cryptology\*

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Communicated by Kaisa Nyberg

Received 8 February 2011  
Online publication 3 May 2012

# State of the Art

Best known Results (After our Paper)

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$4 \times 4$  matrices over  $\mathrm{GL}(8, \mathbb{F}_2)$

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# State of the Art

Best known Results (After our Paper)

$4 \times 4$  matrices over  $GL(8, \mathbb{F}_2)$

Matrix	Naive	Literature	Our Results [Kra+17]		
			PAAR1	PAAR2	BP
AES (Circulant)	152	<b>7+96</b>	108	108	97
[Sim+15] (Subfield)	136	40+96	100	98	100
[LS16] (Circulant)	128	32+96	116	116	112
[LW16]	106	10+96	102	102	102
[BKL16] (Circulant)	136	24+96	116	112	110
[SS16b] (Toeplitz)	123	27+96	110	108	107
[JPS17] (Subfield)	122	20+96	96	95	<b>86</b>

# State of the Art

Finding better matrices?

Type	Previously Best Known	XOR count
$\text{GL}(4, \mathbb{F}_2)^{4 \times 4}$	58 [JPS17; SS16b]	36
$\text{GL}(8, \mathbb{F}_2)^{4 \times 4}$	106 [LW16]	72
$(\mathbb{F}_2[x]/0x13)^{8 \times 8}$	392 [Sim+15]	196
$\text{GL}(8, \mathbb{F}_2)^{8 \times 8}$	640 [LS16]	392
$(\mathbb{F}_2[x]/0x13)^{4 \times 4*}$	63 [JPS17]	42
$\text{GL}(8, \mathbb{F}_2)^{4 \times 4}$	126 [JPS17]	84
$(\mathbb{F}_2[x]/0x13)^{8 \times 8}$	424 [Sim+15]	212
$\text{GL}(8, \mathbb{F}_2)^{8 \times 8}$	663 [JPS17]	424

# Future Work; Questions?

Thank you for your attention!

Do your work!

Apply global optimization  
techniques that are known for  
years!

(But thanks for the easy paper  
😊)



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Mainboard & Questionmark Images: flickr

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